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Justification, Normalcy and Evidential Probability 
 
Martin Smith 
 
My concern in this paper is with a certain, pervasive picture of epistemic justification.  On this picture, acquiring 
justification for believing something is essentially a matter of minimising one’s risk of error – so one is justified 
in believing something just in case it is sufficiently likely, given one’s evidence, to be true.  This view is 
motivated by an admittedly natural thought: If we want to be fallibilists about justification then we shouldn’t 
demand that something be certain – that we completely eliminate error risk – before we can be justified in 
believing it.  But if justification does not require the complete elimination of error risk, then what could it 
possibly require if not its minimisation?  If justification does not require epistemic certainty then what could it 
possibly require if not epistemic likelihood?  When all is said and done, I’m not sure that I can offer satisfactory 
answers to these questions – but I will attempt to trace out some possible answers here.  The alternative picture 
that I’ll outline makes use of a notion of normalcy that I take to be irreducible to notions of statistical frequency 
or predominance. 
 
NOTE: This paper is a reworking of some aspects of a previous paper of mine – ‘What else justification 
could be’ published in Noûs in 2010.  I’m currently in the process of writing a book developing and 
defending some of the ideas from this paper.  What follows will, I hope, fall into place as one of the 
chapters of this book – though it is still very much at the draft stage.  Comments are welcome.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Some philosophers have claimed that, alongside standard Gettier cases, lottery cases provide 
further, vivid counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified, true belief 
(see Hawthorne, 2003, pp9, Pritchard, 2007, pp4).  They reason along the following lines: 
Suppose that I hold a single ticket in a fair lottery of one million tickets.  Suppose that I am 
convinced, purely on the basis of the odds involved, that my ticket won’t win.  Do I know that 
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my ticket won’t win?  Intuitively, I don’t know any such thing, even if it happens to be true.  
Presumably, though, I have plenty of justification for believing that my ticket won’t win – 
after all, given my evidence, this proposition has a 99.9999% chance of being true.  How 
much more justification could one want?  If I’m not justified in believing that my ticket won’t 
win, then surely none of us are justified in believing much at all.  Here is a case, then, in 
which a justified, true belief fails to qualify as knowledge.     
 
This argument seems straightforward enough, and yet there are reasons for being a 
little uneasy.  On reflection, lottery cases seem somehow different from standard Gettier 
cases.  Consider the following for comparison: I wander into a room, undergo a visual 
experience as of a red wall and come to believe that the wall is red.  In actual fact the wall is 
red but, unbeknownst to me, it is bathed in strong red light emanating from a hidden source, 
such that it would have looked exactly the same even if it had been white.  Intuitively, I do 
not know, in this case, that the wall is red, in spite of the fact that my belief is both justified 
and true.   
 
We can observe a number of apparent differences between these two cases.  In 
particular, while my belief in the Gettier case fails to actually qualify as knowledge, it 
nevertheless seems to be a good or promising candidate for knowledge – and would have 
been knowledge if only conditions in the world had been more obliging.  My belief in the 
lottery case, however, doesn’t seem to be the sort of belief that could ever qualify as 
knowledge.  In the Gettier case, the problem seems to lie with the world – and funny, 
abnormal goings on therein.  In the lottery case, the problem seems to lie with me and the 
way in which I form my belief (see Ryan, 1996, pp136, 137). 
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The Hawthorne/Pritchard argument betrays a commitment to a certain, quite 
pervasive, way of thinking about epistemic justification.  The picture is something like this: 
For any proposition P we can always ask how likely it is that P is true, given present 
evidence.  The more likely it is that P is true, the more justification one has for believing that 
it is.  The less likely it is that P is true, the less justification one has for believing that it is.  
One has justification simpliciter for believing P when the likelihood of P is sufficiently high 
and the risk of ~P is correspondingly low.  Call this the risk minimisation conception of 
justification.   
 
 So long as we’re relatively liberal in our interpretation of ‘evidence’ and ‘likelihood’, 
this general picture can be identified in the work of a very broad range of epistemologists.  
Sometimes it is explicitly set-out (see Russell, 1948, chap. VI, Chisholm, 1957, pp28, 
Goldman, 1986, section 5.5, Fumerton, 1995, Pryor, 2004, pp350-351, 2005, BonJour, 2010).  
More often, it is left largely implicit, as in the above reasoning.  I don’t know of any detailed 
arguments in favour of this picture, but the following thought is admittedly quite compelling:  
Most epistemologists are fallibilists of one kind or another and think that a belief can be 
justified even if we don’t have evidence that makes it certain – even if we haven’t completely 
eliminated all risk of error.  But if justification can fall short of evidential certainty, then what 
else could it possibly be if not evidential likelihood?  If justification does not require the 
complete elimination of error-risk, then what else could it possibly require if not its 
minimisation?   
 
It’s tempting to think, when in this mindset, that the risk minimisation conception is 
not really a substantial claim at all – rather it just serves to define a basic fallibilist notion of 
justification that precedes any substantial epistemic theorising.  But whatever else one might 
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think of this picture it can’t really be trivially true.  The idea that beliefs can be appraised as 
permissible or impermissible, in a distinctively epistemic sense, is one that is betrayed by a 
broad range of ordinary practices; by our evaluating the adequacy of methods of inquiry and 
in determining when inquiry into a matter might reasonably cease, by our condemning 
assertions as ungrounded or premature and in our criticising actions for the beliefs upon 
which they are based.  If there is a ‘basic’ notion of justification it is just this: One has 
justification for believing a proposition P iff one is epistemically permitted to believe that P.  
One has more justification for believing P than Q iff one is more strongly epistemically 
permitted to believe that P than to believe that Q.  Even if it is true that the minimisation of 
error risk is what makes belief epistemically permissible, it is not so by stipulation.   
 
In this paper, I shall offer an argument against the risk minimisation conception of 
justification.  I shall also begin the task of outlining an alternative way in which we might 
think about justification – another thing that justification could be, if not risk minimisation.  
My alternative makes use of a notion of normalcy that is irreducible to notions of statistical 
frequency or predominance. 
 
I assume here that evidence is propositional – that one’s body of evidence consists of 
a stock of propositions (Williamson, 2000, section 9.5).  I won’t be defending any particular 
account of when a proposition qualifies as part of one’s body of evidence – indeed, 
everything that I say here will be compatible with a number of different ways of thinking 
about this.  In particular, everything that I say here can be reconciled with generous accounts 
of evidence, such as Williamson’s knowledge account (Williamson, 2000, chap. 9), and with 
more austere psychologistic accounts (Lewis, 1996), as well as a range of further views.  
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Even if we fix upon a particular account of evidence, there is still room for substantial 
disagreement over the nature of evidential probability – over what it takes for a piece of 
evidence to confer a particular probability value upon a proposition.  Externalists about 
evidential probability hold that evidential probability values are, in general, the product of 
contingent facts – and in particular, of facts about relative frequencies.  On this view, roughly 
speaking, the probability of a proposition P, given evidence E, will be determined by the 
frequency with which the truth of E-type propositions is accompanied by the truth of P-type 
propositions in actual and close counterfactual circumstances (see Russell, 1948, chap. VI 
Alston, 1988, section I).  Internalists, on the other hand, conceive of evidential probability 
values as reflecting necessary, internal connections between propositions (see Keynes, 1921, 
Fumerton, 1995, 2004, Conee and Feldman, 2008, section 1.5).  If E confers a certain 
probability value upon P then, according to the internalist, it could not have failed to do so.     
 
I won’t take for granted any particular account of evidential probability.  Neither will 
I assume that propositions always have precise, well-defined evidential probability values 
relative to any possible body of evidence (White, 2005, Williamson, 2000, pp211)
1
.  Our 
intuitions about evidential probability undoubtedly seem clearest when our evidence is of a 
broadly ‘statistical’ nature – when it concerns objective chances or proportions or frequencies 
or the properties of some putatively random process.  I shall largely limit myself to clear-cut 
                                                 
1
 Leplin (2009, chap. 6) argues that most of the ordinary propositions that we believe have no probabilities 
whatsoever.  The claim can be interpreted in a variety of different ways – but any suggestion that the evidential 
probabilities of most ordinary propositions are literally undefined is, I think, very difficult to accept.  Suppose 
I’m sitting in my office with the curtains closed listening to the howling wind and what sound like water 
droplets striking my window pane.  It is, of course, difficult in such circumstances to assign any principled, 
precise evidential probability value to the proposition that it’s raining.  But if this value really were undefined, 
then it would be impossible even to compare the evidential probability of this proposition to that of others – and 
yet this clearly seems possible.  Surely, given my evidence, it’s more likely that it’s raining than sunny, for 
instance.  My objections to the risk minimisation picture, in any case, will not rest upon any general doubts 
about the notion of evidential probability or its scope.  I’ll have more to say about these issues in section IV. 
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cases such as these.  I will have more to say, both about evidence and evidential probability, 
in section IV. 
 
I am taking it for granted here that believing a proposition involves a commitment 
over and above merely regarding it as likely.  In one sense this seems obvious, and there is 
little temptation to think otherwise – to claim that P is likely is precisely to avoid committing 
to its truth
2
.  I can regard it as extremely likely that, say, the number of stars in the universe is 
a composite number or that ticket #542 will lose the lottery without actually believing either 
of these things.  In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes famously advised that 
we should never believe that which is merely probable (rule II).  I take it for granted that such 
advice is, at the very least, intelligible.  (In fact, I am inclined to think that, when 
appropriately construed, Descartes’ advice is perfectly sound – more on this later).  If the 
evidential probability of proposition P given evidence E is high, then it is, in some sense, 
appropriate for any subject in possession of this evidence to offer a generous estimate of P’s 
probability.  Whether it’s permissible for a subject, so situated, to believe that P is true is a 
further question – and one that may, as I hope to show, have different answers depending 
upon the character of E.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 There are, of course, difficult questions about the relationship between outright belief and degrees of belief – 
and these are not questions that I mean to prejudge here.  According to one view, sometimes dubbed the 
‘Lockean Thesis’, outright belief corresponds to a high degree of belief – one counts as believing a proposition 
just when the degree of belief that one invests in it is suitably high (see, for instance, Foley, 1992, 2009).  I don’t 
mean to assume here that such a view is incorrect – only that it cannot be combined with a view on which 
degrees of belief are equated with overt probability estimates.   
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II. PROBLEMS FOR RISK MINIMISATION 
 
There are two simple theses behind what I’ve been calling the risk minimisation conception 
of justification.  One of these concerns categorical attributions of justification and the other 
concerns comparisons:  
(a) One has justification for believing a proposition P iff P is likely, given one’s 
evidence, to be true.   
(b) One has more justification for believing a proposition P than a proposition Q 
iff P is more likely, given one’s evidence, than Q is.  
A further claim is needed in order to make these intelligible: A body of evidence furnishes 
all, or most, propositions with evidential probabilities – probabilities that are usually taken to 
be describable by a classical (Kolmogorovian) probability function
3
.  This is, perhaps, more 
usefully thought of as a precondition for the intelligibility of theses (a) and (b) rather than a 
further thesis alongside them.  Talk of a proposition being ‘likely’ in thesis (a) should be 
further clarified in terms of a proposition having an evidential probability that exceeds some 
threshold t that may be variable and/or vague – but the details of this will matter little for 
present purposes. 
                                                 
3
 A probability function is defined over a set of propositions that includes a ‘maximal’ proposition, entailed by 
each of the others in the set, and is closed under negation and disjunction.  Propositions are standardly modelled, 
for this purpose, as subsets of a set of possible worlds W, with W itself playing the role of the maximal 
proposition.  A classical probability function Pr is any function that assigns real numbers to the propositions in 
this set and satisfies Kolmogorov’s three axioms: 
(i) Pr(P)  0 
(ii) Pr(W) = 1  
(iii) Pr(P  Q) = Pr(P) + Pr(Q), for any P and Q such that P and Q are inconsistent. 
If the domain of the function taken to be infinite, and closed under countable disjunction then a fourth axiom is 
sometimes added: 
(iv) If Pi, i = 1, 2 ... is a sequence of pairwise inconsistent propositions then Pr(iPi) = Pr(P1) + 
Pr(P2) + Pr(P3) ...    
A probability function that satisfies (iv) is known as countably additive. 
 
 It isn’t an essential part of the risk minimisation conception, as I see it, that evidential probabilities be 
Kolmogorovian (though they are standardly taken to be).  The view, as I understand it, can accommodate some 
difference of opinion regarding the formal behaviour of evidential probabilities.   I will mention another sort of 
approach in the final section. 
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One possible argument against the risk minimisation conception proceeds from the 
principle of multiple premise closure.  It’s very plausible that deduction, of all things, should 
be an epistemically secure way of expanding one’s set of beliefs – that deduction should 
never take us from the realm of justified belief into the realm of pure conjecture.  One way of 
attempting to make this rough intuition precise is the following: If one has justification for 
believing each of a set of propositions, then one has justification for believing any 
proposition that deductively follows from them.    
 
Multiple premise closure is in clear tension with thesis (a) of the risk minimisation 
conception.  Multiple premise deductions can aggregate risk – the risk of error to which I 
expose myself in believing the conclusion of a multiple premise deductive inference may be 
higher than the risk of error to which I expose myself in believing any of the premises, taken 
individually.  That is, the evidential probability of the conclusion of a multiple premise 
deduction can be lower than the evidential probabilities of each individual premise and, as 
such, the evidential probability of the conclusion can dip below the threshold for justification, 
even if the evidential probability of each premise surpasses it.   
 
If multiple premise closure fails, then there must be possible situations in which it is 
epistemically permissible to believe the premises of a deductive argument and to accept its 
validity and yet epistemically impermissible to believe its conclusion.  As curious as this 
seems, it won’t be a part of my case against the risk minimisation conception.  Indeed, I shall 
remain officially neutral on the principle of multiple premise closure here.  
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My argument begins, rather, from an example, adapted from one originally devised by 
Dana Nelkin (2000, pp388-389): Suppose that I have set up my laptop such that, whenever I 
turn it on, the colour of the background is determined by a random number generator.  For 
one value out of one million possible values the background will be red.  For the remaining 
999 999 values, the background will be blue.  One day I arrive at a desk in the library and 
turn on my laptop.  Moments before the background appears, I spot my friend Bruce at a 
nearby desk and wander over to say hello.   
 
Bruce is already working away on his laptop and, when I arrive, I immediately see 
that it’s displaying a blue background and come to believe that it is.  Let’s suppose, for the 
time being, that my relevant evidence consists of two propositions (I will consider other ways 
of describing the evidential situation in due course):  
(E1) It visually appears to me that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background. 
(E2) It is 99.9999% likely that my laptop is displaying a blue background.  
 
Here are a few preliminary observations about this case: If I were to believe that my 
laptop is displaying a blue background before returning to my desk, it would be natural to 
describe this belief as a presumption (albeit a very safe one), while it does not seem at all 
natural to describe my belief about Bruce’s laptop in these terms.  Second, my belief about 
Bruce’s laptop would appear to be a very promising candidate for knowledge – indeed, it will 
be knowledge, provided we fill in the remaining details of the example in the most natural 
way.  If I were to believe that my laptop is displaying a blue background, this belief would 
never constitute knowledge even if it happened to be true.  If my battery died before I got 
back to my desk, I might well think to myself ‘I guess I’ll never know what colour the 
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background really was’.  But if Bruce’s battery died I certainly wouldn’t think this about the 
background colour on his laptop.   
 
If someone were to ask me ‘What colour is the background on Bruce’s laptop?’, I 
would be perfectly epistemically entitled to reply ‘It’s blue’.  But if someone were to ask me 
the same question about my laptop, it seems as though I ought to be more circumspect, and 
say something along the lines of ‘It’s overwhelmingly likely that the background is blue – but 
I haven’t actually seen it’.  Presumably, this is what I ought to believe too.  I’m not required 
to do any further investigation into the background colour displayed by Bruce’s laptop – even 
though I easily could by, for instance, asking others to have a look.  But I ought to do more 
investigation into the background colour displayed by my laptop – by, for instance, going and 
having a look myself – before I rest on my laurels. 
 
The implication of these considerations seems clear enough: I have justification for 
believing that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background, but I don’t have justification 
for believing that my laptop is displaying a blue background.   In spite of this, the proposition 
that my laptop is displaying a blue background is more likely, given my evidence, than the 
proposition that Bruce’s is.  While E1 does make it highly likely that Bruce’s laptop is 
displaying a blue background, it clearly does not guarantee that it is.  After all, I could be 
hallucinating, or I could have been struck by colour blindness, or I could be subject to some 
strange optical illusion etc.  No doubt these are all rather unlikely – but presumably the 
likelihood, given evidence E1, that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background would be 
no where near as high as 99.9999%.  This, of course, is precisely how likely it is that my 
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laptop is displaying a blue background, given evidence E2
4
.  In believing that Bruce’s laptop 
is displaying a blue background, I am actually running a higher risk of error than I would be 
in believing the same thing about my laptop. 
   
 The judgment that I lack justification for believing that my laptop is displaying a blue 
background is, on its own, in tension with thesis (a) of the risk minimisation conception.  
This proposition is clearly very likely, given my evidence.  One could, perhaps, try to 
preserve (a) by arguing that the likelihood threshold t should, for whatever reason, be set very 
high in the case that I’ve described.  Bringing into play the judgment that I have justification 
for believing that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background effectively blocks this kind 
of manoeuvre.  We cannot find a likelihood threshold such that it’s likely that Bruce’s 
background is blue, unlikely that my background is blue and yet more likely that my 
background is blue than Bruce’s.   
 
When it comes to thesis (b) of the risk minimisation conception, we do not, in fact, 
even need the judgment that I have justification for believing that the background on Bruce’s 
laptop is blue, or the judgment that I lack justification for believing that the background on 
my laptop is blue.  All that we need is a weaker comparative judgment – that I have more or 
better justification for believing that Bruce’s background is blue than I do for believing that 
                                                 
4
 One could think of this as an instance of David Lewis’s ‘principal principle’ (Lewis, 1980).  Suppose my only 
evidence relevant to a proposition P is that the objective probability of P at time n = x.  Suppose, in particular, 
that I have no relevant evidence pertaining to things that happened after n.  According to the principal principle, 
roughly speaking, the evidential probability of P, for me, will also be equal to x.  Time n, in this case, could be 
thought of as the time at which I turn on my laptop.   
 
Whether my evidence, in the case described, should be interpreted, ultimately, as evidence pertaining 
to an objective probability value is, of course, debatable.  I needn’t take any stand on this – all that is important, 
for present purposes, is that its probabilistic bearing be clear-cut.  It may be that it is best interpreted, at the end 
of the day, as evidence about a propensity or an expected frequency or some such.  It’s worth noting though that 
if we ever have evidence regarding objective probability values, then cases like the one described must be 
amongst the clearest cases in which we do.  
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mine is.  This comparative judgment, then, is strictly enough to refute the letter of the risk 
minimisation conception.  
 
The laptop example prompts a cluster of intuitions that don’t seem to fit in well with 
the risk minimisation picture.  It may be rather tempting, however, for one to simply 
disregard such intuitions as confused or naïve.  Perhaps we are simply accustomed to relying 
upon perception in such matters and suspending any scruples about its fallibility.  Once we do 
reflect carefully upon the fallibility of perception, so this thought goes, these troublesome 
intuitions are exposed as a kind of groundless prejudice.  I’m not entirely convinced that this 
is the wrong thing to say – but I do strongly suspect that it is.  
 
It may help to consider a further, somewhat less contrived, example discussed by 
Enoch, Fisher and Spectre (forthcoming) and Redmayne (2008), amongst others: A bus 
causes some harm on a city street – it damages a car or injures a pedestrian or some such.  In 
the first scenario, an eye witness testifies that the bus was owned by the Blue-Bus company.  
In the second scenario, there is no eye-witness, but there is some unusually strong statistical 
evidence regarding the distribution of buses in the relevant area – evidence to the effect that 
95% of the buses operating in the area, on the day in question, were owned by the Blue-Bus 
company. 
 
Testimony, as we all know, is not perfectly reliable – particularly when it comes to 
testimony concerning an event of this kind.  The eye witness in scenario one could have been 
mistaken about what she saw or could, indeed, have deliberately concocted a lie in order to 
smear the Blue-Bus company.  These possibilities may not be likely, but the probability that 
it really was a Blue-Bus bus that was involved, given the eye witness testimony, is plausibly 
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not as high as 95% – and this, presumably, is exactly how probable the proposition is, given 
the strong statistical evidence available in scenario two
5
.   
 
In spite of this, so long as we don’t have any positive reason to think that the eye 
witness in scenario one is mistaken or lying, it would be perfectly reasonable for us to take 
this testimony at face value and conclude that it was a Blue-Bus bus that was involved.  
Indeed, if this is our only relevant evidence, it would seem reasonable for us to assert and to 
act upon this conclusion.  In scenario two, on the other hand, all that we seem entitled to 
conclude is that it was very likely to have been a Blue-Bus bus that was involved.  To 
conclude that it was a Blue-Bus bus and to assert or act upon this proposition would seem 
premature (see Enoch, Fisher and Spectre, forthcoming, Redmayne, 2008).   
 
This is not just a philosopher’s intuition – and neither is it purely academic.  Under 
prevailing legal practice, the eye witness testimony available in scenario one could serve as a 
legitimate basis for a positive finding to the effect that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus – 
and an associated finding of liability.  In contrast, it would not be legitimate to base a finding 
of liability upon the kind of statistical evidence available in scenario two (for some relevant 
references see Haw, 2009, section IIB, Kaye, 1982, section I)
6
.  The defender of the risk 
minimisation picture could, of course, simply put such conventions down to prejudice as well 
– an unreflective, knee-jerk preference for testimonial over statistical evidence.  Once again, 
                                                 
5
 We might think of this is an instance of what is sometimes called statistical syllogism: If I have evidence to the 
effect that a is a G and that the proportion of Gs that are F is x and have no further evidence relevant to whether 
a is an F, then the evidential probability, for me, that a is an F will be equal to x.  
6
 This example has been the subject of a good deal of discussion within legal theory (for a review, see Ho, 2008, 
chapter 3, section 2.6), and appears to trace back to a genuine civil case – Smith vs Rapid Transit Inc 317 Mass. 
469, 58 N.E. 2d 754 (1945).  Many have concluded, on the basis of examples such as this, that standards of legal 
justification cannot be understood in purely probabilistic terms – a direct analogue, in effect, of the view that I 
shall defend about standards of epistemic justification. 
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this may turn out to be the right thing to say – but I shall experiment, in the next section, with 
a possible way of giving these intuitions and conventions more credit.  
 
III. INTRODUCING NORMIC SUPPORT 
 
Turning back to the laptop example, consider again the relationship between the proposition 
that (P1) Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background, the proposition that (P2) my laptop 
is displaying a blue background, and my available evidence.  Clearly, my evidence entails 
neither P1 nor P2.  It would be perfectly possible for E1 and E2 to both be true while P1 and P2 
are both false.  Notice, though, that if E1 is true and P1 is false, then this would appear to be a 
circumstance crying out for explanation of some kind.  If I visually perceive that Bruce’s 
laptop is displaying a blue background when in fact it is not, then there has to be some 
explanation as to how such a state of affairs came about.  Possible explanations have already 
been floated above – perhaps I’m hallucinating, or have been struck by colour blindness, or 
am subject to an optical illusion etc.  It can’t be that I just misperceive – there has to be more 
to the story.  
 
The circumstance in which E1 and P1 are both true, we might say, is explanatorily 
privileged over the circumstance in which E1 is true and P1 is false.  E2 and P2, however, do 
not appear to stand in this relationship.  Although it would be very unlikely for P2 to be false 
while E2 is true, this is not something that would require special explanation.  All of the 
random numbers that might be generated by my laptop are on an explanatory par.  The 
occurrence of the one ‘red’ number does not require any more explanation than the 
occurrence of the 999 999 ‘blue’ numbers.  This, indeed, is part of what is involved in 
conceiving of a process as genuinely random.  
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If my belief that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background turned out to be false 
then, given the evidence upon which it is based, there would have to be some explanation for 
my error – either in terms of perceptual malfunction or disobliging features of the 
environment.  If my belief that my laptop is displaying a blue background turned out to be 
false then, given the evidence upon which it is based, there need not be any available 
explanation for the error – the buck, as it were, may simply stop with me and the way that I 
chose to form my belief. 
 
We can draw a similar contrast between the two kinds of evidence at play in the bus 
example.  In scenario one, if it turned out that the bus involved was not owned by the Blue-
Bus company, in spite of the eye-witness testimony, then there would have to be some 
accompanying explanation – the eye witness was lying, or was momentarily distracted, was 
mistaken about what Blue–Bus buses look like etc.  It can’t just so happen that the testimony 
was wrong.  In scenario two, though, it could just so happen that the bus involved was not a 
Blue-Bus bus in spite of the fact that 95% of the buses in the area were.  While this would, in 
a sense, be surprising, given the proportions involved, it clearly wouldn’t demand any further 
special explanation.  
 
The idea that normalcy is purely a matter of statistical frequency or propensity is, 
undeniably, an attractive one.  Adopting it, though, forces us to give up on another attractive 
idea – namely, that normal conditions require less explanation than abnormal conditions do.  
Sometimes when we use the term ‘normal’ – when we say things like ‘It’s normal to be right 
handed’ – we might be making a straightforward claim about statistical frequency.  Other 
times – when we say things like ‘Tim would normally be home by six’ or ‘When I turn my 
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key in the ignition, the car normally starts’ – part of what we are trying to express, I believe, 
is that there would have to be some satisfactory explanation if Tim wasn’t home by six or the 
car wasn’t starting. 
 
In this sense of ‘normal’ it could be true that Tim is normally home by six, even if this 
occurrence is not particularly frequent.  What is required is that exceptions to this 
generalisation are always explicable as exceptions by the citation of independent, interfering 
factors – his car broke down, he had a late meeting etc.  If this condition is met, then the best 
way to explain Tim’s arrival time each day is to assign his arrival by six a privileged or 
default status and to contrast other arrival times with this default (see Pietroski and Rey, 
1995).  
 
This may well be possible even if the number of occasions on which Tim arrived 
home by six was outweighed by the number of occasions on which he arrived home later.  
Suppose Tim is significantly delayed, day after day, by protracted roadworks on his usual 
route home and, were it not for the roadworks, he would always arrive home by six.  There’s 
a sense of ‘normal’ on which it remains true that Tim normally arrives home by six – we 
could imagine saying ‘Tim would normally arrive home by six, but these blasted roadworks 
just keep delaying him day after day’. 
 
We cannot explain everything at once – we need to abstract away from certain things 
in order to expose underlying patterns.  This is how the idea of explanatory normalcy arises.  
The notion of explanatorily normal conditions can be usefully compared to the familiar idea 
of an idealised or simplified model of a potentially complex actual phenomenon.  In any case, 
I won’t attempt here to give a full, philosophically satisfactory account of explanatory or 
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idealised normalcy.  My immediate aim is more modest – to present, in rough outline, an 
alternative kind of normalcy that stands apart from the statistical conception that can so easily 
entrance us. 
 
Given my evidence, P2 would frequently be true, but P1 would normally be true.  That 
is, given my evidence, if P1 turned out to be false, then this would demand explanation via 
some independent interfering factor.  We might say, in this case, that my evidence normically 
supports P1.  Given my evidence, if P2 turned out to be false, then no such explanation need 
be available.  My evidence does not normically support P2.   
 
Once again, we can draw a similar contrast between to the two kinds of evidence 
mentioned in the bus case.  Given that 95% of the buses operating in the area of an accident 
were Blue-Bus buses, it would frequently be true that the bus involved in the accident was a 
Blue-Bus bus.  Given that an eye witness testified that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus, 
it would normally be true that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus.  Our evidence in 
scenario one normically supports the conclusion that a Blue-Bus bus was involved, while our 
evidence in scenario two does not.   
 
The distinction between these different sorts of evidential support might fruitfully be 
compared to the distinction between statistical generalisations and ceteris paribus 
generalisations widely accepted in the philosophy of science (see, for instance, Millikan, 
1984, pp5, 33-34, Pietroski and Rey, 1995, 1.2).  It might also be compared to the distinction, 
widely recognised in the philosophy of language, between generics that contain frequency 
adverbs – like ‘As are frequently B’, ‘As are typically B’ – and generics that are ‘unmarked’ 
– generics of the form ‘As are B’ (see, for instance, Leslie, 2008).  These comparisons may 
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be particularly apt if we are inclined to understand evidential probability along externalist 
lines.  On the externalist conception of evidential probability, to say that a piece of evidence 
probabilifies a given proposition is, quite literally, to make a kind of statistical generalisation.  
To claim that a piece of evidence normically supports a proposition is at least close to making 
a kind of ceteris paribus generalisation. 
 
I have characterised a support relation that evidence may bear to a proposition that 
does not simply reduce to probabilification.  And it is not difficult to appreciate, at least in a 
rough and ready way, why this relation might have some connection with epistemic 
justification.  If one believes that a proposition P is true, based upon evidence that normically 
supports it then, while one’s belief is not assured to be true, this much is assured: If one’s 
belief turns out to be false, then the error has to be explicable in terms of disobliging 
environmental conditions, deceit, cognitive or perceptual malfunction or some other 
interfering factor.  In short, the error must be attributable to mitigating circumstances and 
thus excusable, after a fashion.  Errors that do not fall into this category are naturally 
regarded as errors for which one must bear full responsibility – errors for which there is no 
excuse.  And if error could not be excused, then belief cannot be permitted.   
 
What I propose is that, in order for one to have justification for believing a 
proposition, it must be normically supported by one’s evidence.  When one classifies a belief 
as justified, one is effectively committed to the claim that, if the belief is not true, then this 
failure will be independently explicable in terms of some identifiable interfering factor.  To 
borrow a turn of phrase used by Pietroski and Rey (1995, pp84), the notion of justification 
answers to the need to idealise in a complex world, not the need to describe a chancy one.  
The reason that I have justification for believing that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue 
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background, but lack justification for believing that my laptop is displaying a blue 
background is that the former proposition is normically supported by my evidence while the 
latter proposition is not.  In an ideal world, given my evidence, Bruce’s laptop would be 
displaying a blue background.  But mine need not be. 
 
The idea that there is a normic support condition on justification may seem 
reminiscent of a theory sometimes known as abductivism or explanationism.  According to 
the explanationist, in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, the truth 
of that proposition must, roughly speaking, be a part of the best or simplest explanation of 
one’s relevant evidence (Conee and Feldman, 2008, section 3.5)7.  What I am proposing here, 
though, is not a kind of explanationism.  It is possible for a piece of evidence E to normically 
support a proposition P – for the circumstance in which E and P are both true to be 
explanatorily privileged over the circumstance in which E is true and P is false – without P 
providing any sort of explanation for E.  Consider the following example (due to Byerly, 
forthcoming): Suppose it’s a warm, calm day and I’m at the golf course facing a six foot putt 
to the hole.  I strike the ball well – it appears to be rolling directly towards the hole with just 
the right amount of momentum to reach it.  I believe that the ball will soon fall into the hole 
and it’s plausible that my present evidence normically supports this.  If the ball does not fall 
into the hole, in spite of my present evidence, then there will have to be some explanation as 
to why – a sudden gust of wind blows the ball off course, it strikes something on the green 
that diverts it or slows it down etc.  But the proposition that the ball will soon fall into the 
hole doesn’t explain my current evidence.  That is, the proposition that the ball will fall into 
the hole at some future time doesn’t explain my visual experiences now.  It is controversial 
                                                 
7
 A number of epistemologists have defended what might be regarded as explanationist accounts of knowledge 
according to which, roughly speaking, in order for one to know that P, P must enter into the best explanation of 
one’s belief that P (Jenkins, 2008, chap. 3, Goldman, 1988, chap. , Rieber, 1998).  The concerns about 
explanationist accounts of justification that I outline in the body text may carry over to views of this kind, but I 
won’t explore this here. 
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whether propositions about the future can ever enter into explanations of facts about the 
present or past.  But there is no particular obstacle to propositions about the future being 
normically supported by facts about the present
8
.       
 
The condition that P be normically supported by one’s evidence is not the same as the 
condition that P provide the best explanation for one’s evidence.  To infer, from a set of 
premises, a conclusion that they normically support is not to draw an abductive inference, as 
conventionally conceived – it is to draw a defeasible inference of a different kind.  The claim 
that there is a normic support condition on justification is, of course, compatible with there 
being an explanationist condition as well.  Examples such as the above, however, incline me 
to doubt that such a condition is, in general, necessary for justification – though it may be met 
in many cases.  As I strike the ball and watch it roll in the right direction with just the right 
amount of momentum, surely my belief that it will soon fall into the hole is a justified one.   
 
IV. NORMAL WORLDS 
 
Suppose that possible worlds can be compared for their normalcy.  Normic support could, 
then, be understood in terms of variably restricted quantification over worlds: A body of 
evidence E normically supports a proposition P just in case P is true in all the most normal 
worlds in which E is true.  Alternately, E normically supports P just in case the most normal 
worlds in which E is true and P is true are more normal than any world in which E is true and 
P is false.  This opens up a natural way of modelling normic support comparisons: A body of 
                                                 
8
 In order for this kind of example to work, it is not, in fact, necessary that the proposition in question concern 
the future – all that is really required is that my acquisition of the relevant evidence predate the time at which the 
truth value of the proposition in question is settled.  If, after starting to watch the ball, I close my eyes and wait 
then, after a short while, I have evidence normically supporting the proposition that the ball is currently in the 
hole – namely, the perceptual experiences that are still fresh in my mind.  But the proposition that the ball is 
currently in the hole doesn’t explain this evidence. 
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evidence E normically supports a proposition P more strongly than it normically supports a 
proposition Q just in case the most normal worlds in which E is true and Q is false are more 
normal than any world in which E is true and P is false
9
. 
  
In modelling normic support in this way, I am effectively assuming that there will be 
maximally normal worlds in which P is true, for any contingent proposition P.  That is, I’m 
assuming that we cannot have a situation in which, for every P-world, there is a more normal 
P-world.  For simplicity, I shall leave this assumption in place.  If we were to relax it though, 
we would need to alter the characterisation of normic support as follows: A body of evidence 
E normically supports a proposition P just in case some world at which E is true and P is true 
is more normal than any world at which E is true and P is false.  A body of evidence E 
normically supports a proposition P more strongly than it normically supports a proposition Q 
just in case some world in which E is true and Q is false is more normal than any world in 
which E is true and P is false. 
 
On my account, in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition P, it 
is necessary that one’s body of evidence E normically support P – it is necessary that the 
most normal worlds in which E is true are worlds in which P is true.  The probability of P 
given E can reach any level (short, perhaps, of 1) without this condition being met.  Thus, the 
                                                 
9
 It is a consequence of this definition that E normically supports P iff E normically supports P more strongly 
than ~P.  A corresponding principle for justification might be thought counterintuitive: One has justification for 
believing P iff one has more justification for believing P than ~P.  It seems natural to think that, in order for one 
to have justification for believing P it is not enough that one simply have more justification for believing P than 
~P.  More generally, given this definition of comparative normic support, it will turn out that if E normically 
supports P more strongly than any other proposition Q, then E must normically support P.  Once again, the 
corresponding principle for justification seems questionable: If one has more justification for believing P than Q 
then one has justification for believing P.  Since normic support is proposed here merely as a necessary 
condition on justification, these latter principles won’t be derivable from the former principles.  I hope to discuss 
these issues elsewhere.   
22 
 
probability of P given E can reach any level (short, perhaps, of 1) without one having 
justification for believing P
10
.   
 
The following thought fits very naturally with this: In order for one to have more 
justification for believing a proposition P than a proposition Q, it is necessary that one’s 
evidence E normically support P more strongly than Q – it is necessary that any world in 
which E is true and P is false be less normal than the most normal worlds in which E is true 
and Q is false.  The probability of P given E can exceed the probability of Q given E without 
this condition being met.  The probability of P given E can exceed the probability of Q given 
E without one having more justification for believing P than Q.   
 
One thing that we might immediately notice about the notion of normic support, as 
modelled here, is that it will be closed under multiple premise deductive consequence.  If E 
normically supports P and E normically supports Q and P and Q together entail R then it 
follows that E normically supports R.  If E normically supports P, then the most normal E-
worlds are P-worlds.  If E normically supports Q then the most normal E-worlds are Q-
worlds.  If P and Q jointly entail R then all P  Q-worlds are R-worlds.  It follows 
straightforwardly that all the most normal E-worlds are R-worlds.  The argument can be 
easily generalised for any number of premises. 
                                                 
10
 I am inclined to think that there will be possible cases in which one lacks justification for believing even 
propositions that have a probability of 1, given one’s evidence.  The fact that a proposition has an evidential 
probability of 0 need not imply that it is ruled out by, or impossible in light of, one’s evidence.  Suppose my 
evidence is enough to situate the speed of light within a particular interval, but leaves it equally likely that any 
of the values in this interval represents the true speed (our best evidence regarding the speed of light is, I take it, 
just like this).  For any integer n, this intertval could be divided into n mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
sub-intervals such that it is equally likely, given my evidence, that the true value lies within any one of these 
intervals as any other.  The evidential probability that the speed of light is any particular value x within the 
interval must be less than 1/n for any integer n – that is, it must be equal to 0, unless we are willing to 
countenance infinitesimals.  Although the probability that the speed of light is not equal to x is 1, this is 
perfectly consistent with there being possible worlds in which it is equal to x.   As such, my evidence does not 
entail the proposition that the speed of light is not x and, provided some of these worlds are sufficiently normal, 
need not normically support it either.   
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Relatedly, given the possible worlds model that has been employed here, it can be 
shown that the conclusion of a multiple premise deductive inference cannot be less 
normically supported than each of its premises.  Notice, first, that the normic support strength 
that a body of evidence E affords the conjunction P  Q must be equal to the normic support 
strength afforded to the least supported conjunct.  The most normal worlds in which E is true 
and P  Q is false must either be the most normal worlds in which E is true and P is false or 
the most normal worlds in which E is true and Q is false – whichever are more normal.  
Notice, second, that if P  Q entails R, such that all P  Q-worlds are R-worlds, then the 
normic support strength that E affords R can be no lower than the normic support strength 
that it affords P  Q.  Once again, the point clearly generalises beyond the two premise case.   
 
 Since normic support is proposed only as a necessary condition for justification, it 
won’t follow from these observations that justification is closed under multiple premise 
deductive consequence.  Whether we have this result will depend upon what else, if anything, 
we take justification to require.  The laptop example purports to show that high evidential 
probability is not sufficient for justification but does not purport to show that high evidential 
probability is not necessary for justification.  My arguments are quite compatible with the 
following ‘hybrid’ account of justification: One has justification for believing P only if P is 
normically supported by one’s evidence and P is likely, given one’s evidence, to be true.  On 
this view, multiple premise closure will fail (though its failure will not be due to the normic 
support condition).  Though it lacks a certain overall elegance I have not, as admitted, 
provided any reasons to think that this view is incorrect – and won’t attempt to do so here.  
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V. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
As I suggested above, my description of the laptop example and, in particular, of the evidence 
available to Bruce and myself, is potentially contentious.  According to the knowledge 
account of evidence (Williamson, 2000, chap. 9) one’s evidence is equal to one’s knowledge 
– that is, one’s body of evidence consists of all and only the propositions that one knows.  
One who is impressed by this account might object to my description as follows: Once I see 
that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background, I come to know that it is and, according 
to the knowledge account of evidence, this suffices for the proposition to qualify as part of 
my body of evidence.  My evidence, then, will include not just E1 and E2, but P1 as well.  In 
this case, the probability of P1, given my evidence, will be 1 and, thus, will exceed the 
probability P2, given my evidence, contrary to what I have claimed
11
.    
 
 
There is, I think, something dissatisfying about the way in which the knowledge 
account would have us treat this case – though it’s difficult to put one’s finger on precisely 
what it is.  As I noted above, provided we fill in the details of the example in the most natural 
way, my belief that P1 will qualify as a piece of knowledge.  And part of what is puzzling 
about the example is why this should be so – why my belief that P1 should qualify as 
knowledge, while my belief that P2 seemingly never could.  Pointing out that P1 is more 
                                                 
11
 Epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual experience (McDowell, 1982, Pritchard, 2012) may make the 
very same prediction.  According to the epistemological disjunctivist, roughly speaking, there is a fundamental 
epistemic asymmetry between veridical and non-veridical perceptions, such that the former put one in ‘direct 
contact’ with a fact in the world, while the latter do not.  As such, it is a mistake to think that the evidence 
provided by veridical experience is no better than that available when one is subject to an illusion or 
hallucination.  This view poses no particular threat to my construal of the laptop example, for much the same 
reason that the knowledge account of evidence poses no threat.  As I shall show, it isn’t essential to the example 
that my perceptual experience of Bruce’s laptop even be veridical – we could perfectly well suppose it to be a 
hallucination.  It might also be pointed out that examples of this sort need not involve direct perceptual evidence 
at all – as the bus case illustrates, we can, for instance, build an example around a contrast between statistical 
and testimonial evidence.     
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strongly supported by my evidence than P2 looks like the beginnings of an answer to this 
question – but not, it seems, if the knowledge account of evidence is correct.  According to 
the knowledge account, the only reason that P1 is more strongly supported by my evidence 
than P2 is because my belief that P1 is taken to qualify as knowledge while my belief that P2 
is not.  Any attempt to explain the knowledge disparity in terms of an underlying evidential 
disparity quickly re-implicates the very knowledge disparity to be explained.   
 
It may be that these remarks just betray an unwillingness to enter into the spirit of 
‘knowledge-first’ epistemology – but we needn’t pursue this matter further here.  In order to 
answer this objection, we need only point out that the force of the laptop example does not 
depend in any way upon the actual background colour – either of Bruce’s laptop or of mine.  
Indeed, my original description of the case left it open what colour background the two 
laptops were actually displaying.  Suppose that the background colour of both laptops is, in 
fact, red and I really do hallucinate when I look at Bruce’s (unbeknownst to me of course).  
In this case, even the proponent of the knowledge account would, presumably, have to restrict 
my relevant evidence to something along the lines of E1 (see Williamson, 2000, pp198).  But 
the relevant intuitions are unchanged.  Even though I’m now wrong about the background 
colour of both laptops, it still seems that I have better justification for believing that Bruce’s 
background is blue than I do for believing that my background is blue.  It would still be more 
legitimate for me to assert or act upon the former proposition than the latter.  And the former 
belief is still a candidate for knowledge, while the latter is not.    
 
The knowledge account can, in fact, be made to generate the same evidential 
predictions without our needing to suppose that I’m mistaken about the background colour of 
Bruce’s laptop.  We could imagine instead that I’m Gettiered when I set eyes on Bruce’s 
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laptop.  Suppose there was some appreciable risk that I might have suffered a colour 
hallucination at that moment, even though this didn’t eventuate and my perceptual experience 
was perfectly veridical.  So long as the proponent of the knowledge account buys into the 
standard verdict about cases like this, he will, as before, have to restrict my evidence to 
something along the lines of E1 as this is the only relevant knowledge in the vicinity.  But 
whether one is Gettiered with respect to a proposition should have no effect on whether one 
has justification for believing it – or so the conventional thinking would have it, at any rate.   
 
The knowledge account of evidence may not be the most natural fit with my original 
description of the evidence available to me in the laptop example – but, as this discussion 
shows, it is not inconsistent with this description.  On the contrary, provided the details of the 
example are filled out in an appropriate way, the knowledge account can be made to 
explicitly sanction the claim that my relevant evidence consists of just E1 and E2. 
 
While a proponent of knowledge account of evidence might worry that I’m 
underestimating the evidence available to me, one who is attracted to a narrowly 
psychologistic account evidence might worry, instead, that I’m overestimating this evidence.  
On a psychologistic account of evidence, roughly speaking, one’s evidence is supposed to be 
limited to propositions about one’s own mental states – propositions describing one’s 
perceptual experiences, apparent memories, emotions etc.   The suggestion that E2 is literally 
a part of my evidence seems not to be consistent with this.  E2 after all, is a proposition about 
the world, and one that rests upon other propositions about the world – that my laptop is 
currently on and that the random number generator worked etc.  If the psychologistic 
conception of evidence is correct then it couldn’t literally be part of my evidence that my 
laptop is on or that the random number generator worked.      
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Let S comprise the various worldly conditions upon which E2 rests.  In order for the 
laptop example to engage the risk minimisation conception, it is not necessary that S literally 
be a part of my evidence or even that it be certain given my evidence.  In order for the 
example to work, it is enough that the evidential probability of S, for me, be greater than the 
evidential probability of P1.  Let Pr be my evidential probability function once I lay eyes 
upon Bruce’s laptop.  By the theorem of total probability Pr(P2) = Pr(P2 | S).Pr(S) + Pr(P2 | 
~S).Pr(~S) (provided 0 < Pr(S) < 1).  Pr(P2 | S) is, naturally, equal to 0.999999 – the 
evidential probability that my laptop is displaying a blue background given that it is on and 
the random number generator worked etc. will be equal to 0.999999.  And we could, of 
course, push this value as close to 1 as we like, by suitably adjusting the details of the random 
number generator.  Provided, then, that Pr(S) > Pr(P1), we can find a value for Pr(P2 | S) such 
that Pr(P2 | S). Pr(S) > Pr(P1).  It follows that Pr(P2) > Pr(P1), as required.         
 
If one is uncomfortable with the idea that S could be certain, given my evidence, then 
one could imagine instead that S is more likely, given my evidence, than P1.  But one who is 
attracted to a psychologistic conception of evidence might be resistant even to this 
suggestion.  S, as noted above, comprises a number of worldly conditions – that my laptop is 
currently on and that the random number generator worked.  Could my psychological 
evidence really make it more likely that these conditions are met than that Bruce’s laptop is 
displaying a blue background?  For what it’s worth, I think the answer should be ‘yes’, 
provided the details of the example are filled out in the right way.  It would be very odd for 
the psychologistic account of evidence (or any account of evidence) to place some a priori 
limit, strictly less than 1, on how evidentially likely a proposition like S could be.  Be that as 
it may, though, I think it is possible to side-step this kind of position.   
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Let S, once again, comprise all of the worldly conditions upon which E2 rests – that 
my laptop is currently on and that the random number generator worked etc.  Whatever one 
takes the evidential probability of S or of P2 to be, one should concede that the evidential 
probability of S  P2 is at least 0.999999.  That is, the evidential probability that my laptop is 
displaying a blue background if it is on and the random number generator worked, will be at 
least 0.999999.  By the inclusion-exclusion rule, Pr(S  P2) = Pr(~S) + Pr(P2) – Pr(~S  ~P).  
By the theorem of total probability, Pr(S  P2) = Pr(~S) + Pr(P2 | S).Pr(S) + Pr(P2 | 
~S).Pr(~S) – Pr(~S  P2) (provided 0 < Pr(S) < 1).  Even if we concede that Pr(P2 | ~S) = 0 – 
that there is no chance that my laptop is displaying a blue background if S is false – we still 
have it that Pr(S  P2) = Pr(~S) + Pr(P2 | S).Pr(S).  Since Pr(S) = 1 – Pr(~S) and Pr(P2 | S) = 
0.999999, it follows that Pr(S  P2) = Pr(~S) + 0.999999.(1 – Pr(S)) = 0.999999 + 
0.0000001.Pr(~S)  0.999999.   
 
And yet, in the case described, a belief that S  P2 would seem to be in no better 
epistemic shape than a belief that P2.  If I were to believe that my laptop is displaying a blue 
background, if it is on and the random number generator worked, then it would be very 
natural to describe this as a presumption.  Such a belief, furthermore, would not constitute 
knowledge even if it turned out to be true.  If someone were to ask me what colour 
background my laptop is displaying I shouldn’t reply by baldly asserting ‘If it’s on and the 
random number generator worked then it’s blue’.  Rather, I ought to be more circumspect and 
utter a probabilistic conditional like ‘If it’s on and the random number generator worked then 
it’s overwhelmingly likely to be blue’.   
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It’s no more plausible that I have justification for believing S  P2 than that I have 
justification for believing P2.  As such, given that the evidential probability of S  P2, for me, 
exceeds the evidential probability of P1, the example will continue to engage with the risk 
minimisation conception.  We can simply put aside the question of how evidentially likely P2 
is and let the example be driven by the contrast between P1 and S  P2.   
 
A final objection to my description of the laptop example takes issue not with my 
description of the available evidence but, rather, with my assumptions as to how this evidence 
serves to confer evidential probability values upon P1 and P2.  The idea that propositions 
should always have precise evidential probability values is one that is often challenged – 
particularly when the evidence in question is not of an overtly statistical kind (see, for 
instance, Levi, 1985, Sturgeon, 2008).  While my evidence in favour of P2 is of a broadly 
statistical kind, my evidence in favour of P1, of course, is not.  While we have no particular 
trouble accepting that the probability of P2 given my evidence is equal to 0.999999, the 
selection of any precise value for the probability of P1 given my evidence is likely to strike 
one as artificial and contrived – there are many values that seem clearly wrong, but none that 
seem clearly right.  And yet, haven’t I effectively assumed, in my description of the laptop 
case, that P1 does have some precise value, given my evidence – indeed a value less than 
0.999999? 
 
Just because we cannot find some natural or obvious precise value to assign to the 
probability of P1, given my evidence, we should, I think, be cautious about concluding that it 
has no precise value.  This inference seems to rest on the assumption that the probabilistic 
bearing of a body of evidence should always be transparent or accessible to us – but it isn’t 
clear to me that such an assumption is viable in all cases.  Certainly if we adopt an externalist 
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construal of evidential probability the assumption would in general be false.  On an 
externalist construal of evidential probability, the evidential probability of P1, given my 
evidence, will be determined, in effect, by the frequency with which experiences of the sort 
described by E1 are veridical in actual and relevant hypothetical scenarios.  If an externalist is 
willing to accept that this frequency has a precise value, he should also be willing to accept 
that the evidential probability of P1, given my evidence, has a precise value – albeit not one 
that we are in any immediate position to ascertain.    
 
In any case, in order for the laptop example to have its desired effect, the evidential 
probability of P1 need not take a precise value.  All that is needed is the truth of a certain 
comparative claim – and, while it may seem unnatural for P1 to be assigned a precise 
evidential probability value, it does not seem at all unnatural for P1 to feature in certain 
evidential probability comparisons.  Consider the following: ‘It’s more likely, given my 
evidence, that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background than a green one’ and ‘While 
it’s likely for me that Bruce’s laptop is displaying a blue background, it is not as likely as 
99.9999%’.  Both of these comparative claims seem clearly true, irrespective of whether 
we’re inclined to think that P1 has some precise evidential probability.   
 
The final comparison is, of course, exactly what is needed in order for the laptop 
example to engage with the risk minimisation conception – assuming that 99.9999% is 
precisely how likely P2 is, for me.  In fact, if we wished, we could even do away with the idea 
that the evidential probability of P2 takes a precise value.  Pared down to its bare essentials, 
all that the example requires is the truth of the following comparison: P2 is more likely, given 
my evidence, than P1.   
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There are a number of ways of formally modelling imprecise probabilities – but the 
model that is, perhaps, most familiar to philosophers exploits a set of probability functions  
– sometimes termed a representor – to capture the probabilistic bearing of a body of evidence 
(see, for instance, Levi, 1974, 1985, Van Fraassen, 1990, Hájek, 2003, Joyce, 2005, 
Weatherson, 2007).  A proposition P will only have a precise evidential probability value in 
case all of the functions in one’s representor agree on how likely the proposition is – if they 
all assign it the same value.  Otherwise, P will be associated with a range of values.  The 
composition of a representor is standardly constrained so as to ensure that these values form 
an interval
12
.   
 
The right way to apply such a model to the laptop case is, presumably, to have all of 
the functions in my representor assign a value of 0.999999 to P2, but to have them assign a 
spread of values to P1.  So long as no function in my representor assigns P1 a value as high as 
0.999999, however, we will have the required comparison – namely, that the evidential 
probability of P1 is less than 0.999999 and, indeed, less than the evidential probability of P2.  
We could even, if we wish, accommodate the idea that some function in my representor 
assigns P1 a value higher than 0.999999, so long as no function assigns it a value of 1.  After 
all, we can simply alter the details of the random number generator so as to push the precise 
evidential probability of P2 as close to 1 as we like.   
 
                                                 
12
 A representor is standardly required to be convex – that is, closed under the operation of taking weighted 
averages of probability functions.  More formally, a representor  is convex just in case for every Prx   and 
Pry  , (Prx + (1 - )Pry)  , for all , 0    1.  The weighted average of two probability functions is itself 
defined by taking the weighted average of the two values assigned to each proposition.  More formally, for 
every proposition P over which Prx and Pry are defined (Prx + (1 - )Pry)(P) = Prx(P) + (1 - )Pry(P).  That the 
new function, so defined, is indeed a probability function can be easily proved.  As can be clearly seen, the 
values assigned to a proposition by the functions in a convex representor must themselves be closed under the 
taking of weighted averages and, thus, form a real interval. 
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If some function in my representor did assign P1 the value 1, then there would indeed 
be no way to make the crucial comparison come out as true.  But, given the way in which 
evidential probability comparisons are evaluated on the present model, such a modelling 
choice would have exceedingly implausible consequences.   A proposition P counts as less 
likely than a proposition Q, relative to representor  , just in case every function in  assigns 
P a lower value than Q – for all Prx , Prx(P) < Prx(Q) (see Joyce, 2005, section 2, 
Weatherson, 2007, section III).  If we include in my representor a function that assigns P1 the 
value 1 then, given my evidence, P1 won’t count as less likely than any other proposition and, 
accordingly, no other proposition will count as less likely than ~P1.  But this doesn’t seem to 
be an accurate reflection of my epistemic position.  It may be unlikely, for me, that Bruce’s 
laptop is not displaying a blue background, but it’s surely even less likely, for instance, that 
I’ll win 10 consecutive national lotteries or that I’m about to spontaneously combust or that 
Bruce’s laptop is not displaying a blue background and there’s an even number of blades of 
grass on my lawn.  
 
In this paper I’ve argued that the risk minimisation conception of justification is 
flawed and have begun to sketch an alternative picture.  In section I, I quoted some advice 
from Descartes – namely, that one should never believe that which is merely probable.  In 
one sense, I concur with this.  If the only thing that can be said in favour of a proposition is 
that it is probable, given one’s evidence then, in my view, one would not be justified in 
believing it.  In another sense, I, like any fallibilist, will reject Descartes’ advice – in my view 
one can be perfectly justified in believing things that are less than certain.  The compatibility 
of these two views owes to the fact that there are a range of ways in which evidence can 
make a proposition more than probable, though less than certain.  I have outlined one such 
way here. 
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